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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (23 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681159

2 May 1968

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)**

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 214TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVGC-WC

8 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL)
(RCS CS FDR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES

A. (C) GENERAL:

1. The 214th Combat Aviation Battalion continued to provide responsive highly effective aviation support to Allied Forces in the Republic of Vietnam as directed by II Field Forces, Vietnam.

2. In addition to being highly mission oriented, emphasis and effort continued to be placed on base improvement at Bearcat, Long Binh, and Black Horse.

3. With the 195th AHC becoming operational on 1 December 1967 and the assignment of the 135th AHC to the 214th CAB from the 222nd CAB on 5 January 1968, this organization became the largest helicopter battalion in the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

4. Personnel infusion programs initiated for the 17th AHC and 195th AHC in November progressed slowly. This was due to other units either being completely infussed or having the same "hump" periods.

B. (U) MISSION:

1. To provide aviation support to United States, Republic of Vietnam, Free World Military Armed Forces in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones as directed by the Commanding General, II Field Forces, Vietnam and the Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

2. Commands and administers assigned and attached Army

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

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Aviation and support units.

C. (C) ORGANIZATION: (Annex A and B) Organization of the 214th CAB during the reporting period included the following units with headquarters located as indicated:

1. Headquarters and Headquarters Company - Bearcat, RVN
2. 17th Assault Helicopter Company - Long Binh, RVN
3. 135th Assault Helicopter Company - Black Horse, RVN
4. 191st Assault Helicopter Company - Bearcat, RVN
5. 195th Assault Helicopter Company - Long Binh, RVN
6. 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company - Bearcat, RVN
7. 240th Assault Helicopter Company - Bearcat, RVN

D. (U) COMMAND:

1. On 19 Nov 67, MAJ Billie E. Sprague assumed command of HHC, 214th CAB, replacing CPT John Hanko.
2. On 27 Dec 67, LTC James H. McWhorter, Jr assumed command of the 214th CAB, replacing LTC Robert J. Standley.
3. On 10 Jan 68, MAJ Lewis W. Wright III assumed command of the 200th ASHC, replacing MAJ Charles R. Jones.
4. On 13 Jan 68, LTC Leo C. Bryan assumed command of the 214th CAB, replacing LTC James H. McWhorter, Jr.
5. On 15 Jan 68, MAJ Donald G. Andrews assumed command of the 17th AHC, replacing MAJ Thomas W. O'Conner.

E. (C) PERSONNEL:

1. Staff changes: The following changes in key staff personnel were made during the period:

- a. MAJ Gale T. Reeves replaced MAJ Den R. Smith as S-3 (12 Nov 67).
- b. LTC James H. McWhorter, Jr replaced LTC Charles S. Steen, Jr as Battalion Executive Officer (14 Dec 67) (Acting Commander 27 Dec 67 - 12 Jan 68).

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c. MAJ Jewel G. White replaced MAJ James R. Gottschus
as S-1 (19 Dec 67).

d. MAJ Lawrence E. Corser, Jr became the Maintenance Officer on 1 Jan 68, vacant since MAJ Leonard J. Rodowick departed 12 Dec 67.

2. Administration: In this reporting period the battalion's authorized strength increased from 1590 to 1890. The assigned strength was 1837 or 97% at the close of the period. The battalion had 189 personnel rotated to CONUS and 215 assigned from CONUS. There were 32 emergency leaves and 3 compassionate leaves granted. With the arrival of one company and infusion, the personnel section in or out processed 1695 individuals.

3. Civic Action:

a. The 214th C/R sponsored two projects during the reporting period. The "pig-sty" project initiated in the previous quarter was completed.

b. Problem Areas:

(1) Civic action in the hamlet, Tan Mai II, was hampered due to residents possessing stolen goods from the U.S. Government. At least three raids were made by the Provost Marshal, 9th Infantry Division, and a thousand dollars of material was reclaimed. These incidents were reported through proper channels and coordination was made to investigate the situation. A satisfactory settlement has not yet been reached.

c. Commodity Distribution: Commodities were available from three sources: Operation Kansas from the 9th Infantry Division, voluntary contributions within the Battalion, and funds from the 9th Division G-5. These assets were used to raise the standard of living in a local hamlet and to further implement the Civic Action objectives.

d. Commodities provided were:

- (1) 14 pigs purchased for 60,000 piasters
- (2) 1840 pounds of food including meat, fruit, vegetables, desserts, and dairy products.

4. Chaplain Activities:

a. The consolidated chapel used by the 214th C/R and the 9th Inf Div Sup Command was dedicated this quarter. Although not fully completed, the chapel is in full use for religious services. The

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chapel will be finished early in next quarter and offices for the chaplains and their assistants will be established.

b. A vehicle was hand-received to the chaplain (1 ton truck) and official orders were cut placing him on the 9th Inf Div Chapel Fund council.

c. Chaplain services performed during the quarter are as follows:

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>OCCASIONS</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Group Worship	12	229
Visits	115	
Counseling	99	
Off Post Projects	2	
Memorial Services	3	300

5. Information:

a. During the reporting period the battalion information program took a serious dip - the weekly newspaper ceased. Emphasis waned and the information program suffered due to other priorities and S-1 functions. It was learned that this situation could not continue. There must be an active program to help boost morale and insure that the battalion and its personnel get equal time and space in popular media. The home town news release program remained active with photographs and stories to accompany.

b. Armed Forces television reporters and cameramen visited the 135th AHC to film and interview the American/Australian team in their work and operations. This will be made into a program type film for showing over Australian and American television.

6. Education: The battalion education program has continued to enjoy progress and success considering the long daily hours of operation within the units. The 9th Inf Div full service education center is now operating 6 days a week. At present the battalion has approximately 105 people enrolled in various courses or working on obtaining their high school GED. The center at Long Binh is supporting the 17th AHC and 195th AHC with Vietnamese Language courses.

7. Morale:

a. The morale of the battalion has remained high. A

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continuous period of successful operations has contributed greatly to this state. Letters of commendations and appreciation from supported units continue to flow in, and are indorsed down to the lowest possible echelon. In addition to the active and responsive awards and decorations program, an all-out effort to maintain a maximum R&R program has been in effect. This battalion has enjoyed a very successful R&R program whereby almost every person receives his choice of time and location out of country to rest and recuperate.

b. Concurrently with these activities, the physical facilities within the battalion area have soared to near completion, except for the newly assigned units. Semi-permanent barracks and provisions for recreational facilities continue to be established.

8. Discipline: Disciplinary actions remain low, indicating a high state of discipline within the command. Although the over all number of disciplinary incidents has increased over the last quarter, the increased strength results in a lower rate. Article 15's numbered 46, Summary Court Martials - 6, and Special Court Martials - 3. No General Court Martial was recorded. This represents a decline of 4 Court Martial actions and an increase of 24 Article 15's. Four AHC's were present with the battalion for this entire quarter, with the addition of one more company in the last month.

9. Awards and Decorations: The awards and decorations program increased again with the arrival of new companies. Increased emphasis was placed on the NCO's and officers in supervisory jobs to recognize and be responsible for submitting their men for awards due. It was stressed how important it is for the company level awards and decorations personnel to establish a workable program of maintaining records and establishing procedures for processing. Most units maintained close liaison with the battalion and increased efficiency in processing resulted. (See Annex C, Statistics Summary)

10. Casualties: During the period a total of 58 casualties were reported with the following break down:

Hostile

Minor	17
USI	1
KIA	1

Non Hostile

Minor	25
VSI	3
Killed	5
Missing to Dead	6

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F. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

1. General:

a. Normal intelligence functions continued during the reporting period.

b. One additional Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to the Battalion during this period, however, it was already in-country and had received the initial security orientation and security clearances had been processed.

2. Security:

a. A total of 1093 classified documents were processed by the S-2 section during this period.

b. During this period, a total of 30 SECRET documents were destroyed and 7 were downgraded per instructions contained in basic document.

c. An end of year inventory was conducted for accountability. All documents were accounted for. There are 18 SECRET documents on hand at the close of the reporting period.

d. This Battalion had one security violation which required formal investigation. It concerned the loss of an SOI which was on board a downed aircraft. The investigation was completed and results forwarded to higher headquarters.

3. Counterintelligence:

a. This unit had 2 acts of suspected sabotage during this period. One instance involved a UH-1C aircraft. The safety wire to the quick disconnect of the hydraulic line was cut. The other instance, also involving a UH-1C aircraft, was that the cotter keys on the tail rotor pitch-change links had been removed and the bolts holding the blade were loosened.

b. A request for CI assistance was forwarded to higher headquarters on 29 Dec 67. Investigation is still in progress.

G. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. Hq and Hq Co, 214th CAB, 191st AHC, 200th ASHC, and the 240th AHC were operational for 92 days during the reporting period. The 17th AHC and attachments spent 5 days in-country training and were operational for 87 days. The 195th AHC spent 30 days in-country training and were operational for 62 days. The 135th AHC completed the move

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from Yung Tau, RVN, to Black Horse, RVN, without loss of operational time; therefore, they were operational for 26 days within the Battalion. During the period, Battalion UH-1 helicopters flew 30,449 hours and CH-47 helicopters flew 3,456 hours. Battalion gunships accounted for 89 VC KBA (BC), 98 UH-1's and 12 CH-47's were hit by enemy fire with 1 crew member KIA and 27 crew members wounded. (Annex C statistical summary).

2. Operations:

a. The 214th CAB supported the 9th Inf Div and 18th ARVN Div on Operation Sante Fe, which opened Hwy 1 from Xuan Loc to the II Corps boundary. A battalion lift consisting of six assault helicopter companies was conducted on 3 Nov 67 lifting from selected PZ's at Long Thanh, Xuan Loc, and Gia Ray to LZ's in vicinity of YS815965 and YS646912. No enemy contact was encountered.

b. On 16 Nov, four lift companies and one chinook company supported the 9th Inf Div to go on Operation Cuu Long. Numerous insertions were made to provide secure areas for the placement of fire support bases and relocation of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. All LZ's were softened with extensive air and artillery preparations. Enemy contact was sporadic and 6 UH-1's and 1 CH-47's received hits.

(1) The operation continued on 18 Nov when the 214th continued supporting the 9th Inf Div with combat assaults and repositioning of artillery pieces. No enemy contact was encountered, and the lift companies reverted to brigade control later in the day.

(2) The concluding battalion size operation in support of Cuu Long was accomplished on 23 Nov when similar tasks completed the repositioning and preparation of the Div for future offensives. During the course of this support, 3847 troops and 705 tons of cargo were moved during 1044 hours of flying time.

c. Support of the 18th ARVN Div continued through this period and vast improvements in utilization of airmobile resources are evident. A permanent liaison officer is now being furnished and should enhance our relationship with the division.

(1) The previous ORLL submitted by this organization contained information of a lost aircraft which had apparently become disoriented in bad weather on 29 Aug 67. The aircraft wreckage was discovered on 16 Nov 67 by the 11th Armored Cav Regiment at YS4189. A representative of this organization established the identity of all crewmembers and passengers and concluded that the aircraft probably burned upon impact.

d. Two companies of the Battalion were TDY from their home locations during December and January, and the bulk of a third company

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also operated a considerable distance from its base. The 240th AHC moved temporarily to Phan Thiet (ZT1647) on 1 Dec 67 and Bao Loc (ZT0870) on 13 Dec 67 to support a brigade of the 101st ABN Div and conducted numerous combat assaults and re-supply missions in that area. They were relieved on station by the 17th AHC on 15 Dec 67 and returned to Bearcat. The 17th continued the same type of support until 15 Jan 68 when they were returned to Long Binh, since the brigade was re-locating.

(1) The 195th has been supporting the 5th Special Forces in operations throughout the II FFV northern sector and occasionally into the 1st FFV sector. Most of these missions are highly classified and their activity cannot be discussed in detail. The support was initiated on 1 Dec 67 and will continue for an indefinite period of time.

e. On 10 Jan 68, a battalion of the 199th LIB was lifted from fire support base Nashva to several LZ's in support of Operation Manchester. The infantry's mission was to conduct a village cordon and search. This required simultaneous landings of the maximum number of securing personnel on the ground, to be immediately followed by positioning of the search element. The ground commander had developed an excellent plan and the operation was completely successful. By providing a 100 meter separation between aircraft, maximum coverage of the LZ/cordon was accomplished by each lift.

f. The Battalion conducted an extraction for the Royal Australian Task Force utilizing the 135th AHC and the 240th AHC on 21 January 1968. 946 troops were extracted from five PZ's in the vicinity of YS4480 and YS3690 to Nui Dat. The extraction was completed without incident or enemy fire.

g. A two company operation was conducted on 24 Jan 68 to move the 2nd and 7th RAR's from Nui Dat and a fire support base at YT115183. This was a repositioning of the two units and included the use of Chinooks for troop and artillery lifts. No enemy fire was encountered and the operation was completed without any significant events.

3. Training:

a. The date of 15 Nov for initiation of the Thai training program was slipped, and 40 aviation personnel of the Royal Thai Army arrived for UH-1 instruction on 28 Nov. The 27 enlisted personnel were divided equally between the 191st and 240th Assault Helicopter Companies for quarters, mess, and immediate OJT. The officers were also attached to a host company for essentially the same purposes, but began their formal transition with battalion instructors. The concept is to qualify the 13 aviators at battalion level and later continue the development of their proficiency thru assignment to a company for daily missions. Approximately one-half of the aviators have been cleared for combat assaults and it is anticipated the balance will be qualified in the near future. All Thai personnel are utilized and treated as regular members

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of their respective organizations.

(1) Considerable difficulty has been experienced in the administration of pay and personnel services for this contingent. Liaison had been conducted earlier with MAGTHAI and all interested headquarters, but directives for the Thai Regiment were apparently not definitive enough. In addition, no personnel records of any nature have been received by the regiment and pay remains a problem. A request for liaison authority with MAGTHAI by a representative of this Battalion is presently under consideration by the 1st Avn Bde.

b. As a result of the increasing trend in aviation accidents, an intensified standardization program was initiated within the Battalion. All unit instructor pilots were given standardization rides by the 214th SIP, regardless of lapsed time since the previous ride, and were in turn directed to accelerate the program within their respective companies.

H. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. Summary of S-4 Activities:

a. Supply:

(1) During this period normal supply activities were conducted by units of this Battalion. Major shortages of equipment effecting unit operations were two UH-1C's, four UH-1D's, nine UH-1H's, and one truck, tractor, wrecker 5 ton.

(2) Body armor and ballistic helmets for air crew members are still in short supply. Redistribution of assets presently provide all crews participating in combat assaults with body armor, however, the limited supply does require continuing redistribution within each unit on a daily basis.

(3) The routine supply of flight gloves became critical during this period. Follow-up action revealed that greater control is necessary to insure that timely requisitions are placed by the units and that issues of this type item be made only to aviation units.

(4) An inspection of all supply activities within this Battalion was conducted during January, 1968. All units were rated satisfactory, however, property records reflected some minor irregularities. Follow-up inspections will be conducted in March, 1968.

(5) An improved helicopter refueling system was developed and installed on the battalion helipad at Camp Martin Cox during this period. The system consists of two 10,000 gallon bladders, one 350 gallon per minute pump and a four inch manifold with twelve UH-1 and four

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CH-47 refueling points. The use of the 350 gpm pump greatly reduces the refueling time for aviation units during the conduct of tactical operations, allowing more efficient utilization of assigned aircraft.

(6) A study of aircraft armament system ammunition basic loads was conducted and a standardized basic load for all assigned Assault Helicopter Companies was published during this period. The establishment of the basic load proved beneficial during the increased period of armed helicopter utilization on 30-31 January 1968.

b. Maintenance:

(1) The equipment serviceability profile for this Battalion during this period was 77.5% Green, 6.5% Amber, and 16% Red. The Green and Amber percentages are well within the C-1 profile limits established by AR 200-1; however, the Red rating is 6% over the established minimum. This overage in the Red rating was caused by shortages in repair parts, the relocating of supporting activities, and the extreme operational conditions that equipment must operate in combat. Because this Battalion is presently operating from a stable base camp and is performing its combat mission, this Red rating has presented no adverse effect in the units combat support role.

(2) Aircraft availability for UH-1D and UH-1H aircraft averaged 87%, which is above the USARV standard of 80%. The availability rate could be slightly higher if the excessive delivery time required for parts was shortened. At the present time most large items such as engines, rotor blades, and transmissions are shipped from 58th Transportation Battalion, Saigon, to the 388th Transportation Company, Vung Tau, by barge. It is not uncommon for this delay to be as high as 4 to 5 days.

(3) Availability for UH-1C aircraft was 83.5% for this period. The varied problems associated with the 540 rotor system are still an area of concern; however, on or about 1 March 68 this situation should be alleviated as local rebuild of rotor-heads will be possible in RVN.

(4) Aircraft availability for the CH-47A was 45.7% which is below the standards established by USARV. The 200th Assault Support Helicopter Company was required to over-fly its flying hour program by 50% because of operational necessity. This over-flying of the designed program has caused a greater than normal requirement on the repair parts system. Items such as engines, swashplates, rotor blades, high pressure hoses, and repair parts in general were the major cause of below average availability.

c. Construction:

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(1) During this period aircraft revetments for all units, except the 135th Assault Helicopter Company and the 17th Assault Helicopter Company have been completed. Due to the recent move of the 135th AHC to Black Horse, their aircraft revetments are only 50% complete. The aircraft revetments for the 17th AHC at Long Binh are 70% complete and are scheduled for completion by 1 March 1968.

(2) The Battalion has expended more than 17,500 U.S. man hours and over 10,000 daily labor man hours during this period on self-help construction. Projects included one 30 man Bn, two 78 man Bn's, five 60 man billets, one tactical bunker, and one orderly/supply room building. One Bn, four billets, and the orderly/supply room have been completed.

(3) The Battalion has worked closely with the 9th Inf Div and the 93rd Engr Bn in the development of an aviation facility at Dong Tam. Areas have been programmed for one Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combat Aviation Battalion; two Assault Helicopter Companies; and one Assault Support Helicopter Company.

I. (C) SIGNAL:

1. Command Post Communications: Communications continued to be improved during the reporting period. Sole-user (hot) lines now connect the battalion operations center with all operational units. Secure nets have been installed for these companies located at other installations and daily operational reports are rendered through this media. The VSC-2 radio proved highly effective by providing excellent communications with the units TDY to distant locations.

J. (U) MEDICAL:

1. Summary of Activities:

a. Routine sick call consisted of about 25 patients a day. The relative number of the common problems remained constant. The VD rate went from 20 to 25 cases per month down to 12 cases last month. A vigorous educational program is given credit for this. One case of infectious Hepatitis was diagnosed. Prophylactic doses of gamma globulin were given to the appropriate individuals. No other communicable diseases were seen.

b. A lecture on hepatitis including its signs and symptoms, etiology and mode of transmission was given at the weekly CI meeting. A short discussion of drugs and their abuses was also included.

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c. An episode of *Staphylococcus Eutesitis* involving 92 men was dealt with. Careful checking by culture revealed the source, precautionary measures were stressed to the proper individuals.

K. (C) AVIATION SAFETY:

1. The Battalion investigated thirteen major accidents. Cause factors indicate eight engine failures and five pilot error accidents.

2. All engines have been shipped to ARADMAC to determine cause of failures. An intensified training program was initiated to insure that all pilots are current in proper emergency and operational procedures.

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SECTION II

Commander's Observations and Recommendations

PART I

Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. (C) Personnel:

1. Item: Inadequacy of TOE Personnel authorization:

a. Discussion: As stated in the last ORNL report the TOE does not provide sufficient personnel to perform the required mission of the battalion headquarters in Vietnam, nor in the area of security elements. During the last quarter, and previously, the units, including the battalion headquarters company, were maintained at or above 105%. During this quarter the battalion dropped to 95-96% at times. At each of the three separate locations where battalion companies are located, requirements for perimeter type security constitute 5-6% of the unit's strength. In actuality, all these units were often maintaining 24 hour, 7 day week operations with only 90% of authorized personnel. In a sustained operation, such as in Vietnam, this taxes heavily on the efficiency and morale of the men.

b. Observation: Again it is seen that aviation units should be reorganized under a TOE that is realistically based upon what is required to accomplish this type mission.

B. (C) Operations:

1. Item: Aviation support for Long Range Patrol Units.

a. Discussion: The mission of aviation elements supporting LRP's is to insert patrols (size varying from six to twenty men) at selected sites in the greatest possible secrecy and to extract them upon completion of their mission or when they are compromised to the detriment of their mission. The ideal aviation element to support this mission is six lift helicopters and four armed helicopters. This organization provides adequate support on a 24 hour basis, to include a Command and Control aircraft, back up aircraft for emergency extractions and a constant target coverage by the armed ships.

b. Observation: When six lift aircraft and four armed aircraft are withdrawn from the resources of an Assault Helicopter Company, the company is no longer effective for its major role. An augmentation of four additional armed aircraft would enable an Assault Helicopter Company to simultaneously support two widely separated Long Range Patrol missions; therefore, a more effective utilization could be realized from resources available.

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2. Item: Deceptive measures are a must for combat assaults.

a. Discussion: Recent experience has proven that the Viet Cong are aware of the procedures and techniques being employed in conducting air mobile assaults. The majority of hits taken are either just prior to touchdown, on the ground, or on initial take off from the LZ. Very seldom is fire received until the lift ships are committed to a landing.

b. Observation: All precautions should be taken to deceive the enemy of intended landing sites. Reconnaissance of the LZ should be held to very minimum and if feasible, a reconnaissance should not be conducted. The use of white phosphorus to signal the last round of artillery preparation should not be a "must". Gunships orbiting the LZ should not be permitted until the last possible moment unless a suppression is being fired.

C. (U) Training and Organization: NONE

D. (U) Intelligence: NONE

E. (C) Logistics:

1. Item: Airfield Directory for Helicopter Operations.

a. Discussion: Aviation units, subject to employment on emergency basis in areas other than their normal area of operation, are often unfamiliar with the refueling and rearming capabilities at the numerous base camps located throughout RVN. This lack of information creates confusion and could seriously effect the tactical situation.

b. Observation: The publication of an Aviation Facility Directory, listing refueling and rearming capabilities, would provide aviation units with information for planning and executing operations in all areas of RVN. NOTAM's could be utilized to update the directory with current information.

2. Item: Admin/Log Radio Net.

a. Discussion: During the recent attack on Long Binh Post, communications between this headquarters and 12th CAG Headquarters were limited to the 12th Gp Command Net. Administrative and logistical information was either delayed or required transmission over the Command Net, interfering with the tactical operation/traffic.

b. Observation: An Admin/Log Radio Net for the transmission of other than tactical information would reduce the radio traffic on the Command Net and allow for the orderly flow of administrative and logistical reports during practice or actual alerts.

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3. Item: Soil Stabilization in Aircraft Maintenance Areas.

a. Discussion: The use of pene-prime as a soil stabilizer in aircraft maintenance areas has proven unsatisfactory. The requirement for vehicular traffic, i.e. wreckers, fork lifts, tank trucks, and auxiliary power units, within the maintenance area causes the pene-prime surface to rapidly deteriorate into an unstabilized surface. The down wash from helicopter rotor blades aggravates the situation, causing unsafe conditions when close tolerance parts are in various stages of desassembly and repair.

b. Observation: The use of FSP or M8A1 planking in the aircraft maintenance area will provide the necessary stabilization for safer maintenance operations.

4. Item: Lateral Search for EDP Aircraft Parts.

a. Discussion: A lateral search for EDP aircraft parts within this battalion has been established and has proven successful in returning aircraft to an operationally ready status. Presently the lateral search is on an informal basis, used as necessary when EDP rates start to climb. The search extends beyond the units assigned to this battalion, generally to the two direct support units providing back up direct support for assigned Assault Helicopter Companies.

b. Observation: A formal lateral search procedure between Transportation Direct Support Companies could prove beneficial to all aviation units in RVN. This procedure would eliminate duplication of efforts of unit and battalion maintenance officers in locating repair parts necessary to return aircraft to an operational condition.

F. (U) Signal: NONE

G. (U) Medical: NONE

H. (U) Aviation and Safety: NONE

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PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) Personnel: NONE

B. (C) Operations:

1. An Assault Helicopter Company be augmented with four additional gun ships, which would enable an Assault Helicopter Company to support two Long Range Patrol Missions simultaneously.

C. (U) Training and Organization: NONE

D. (U) Intelligence: NONE

E. (C) Logistics:

1. An Admin/Log radio be established between Aviation Group and Aviation Battalions.

2. A solid stabilized surface of PSP or MPA1 planking become Mission Essential Requirements for aircraft maintenance areas.

3. An airfield directory, showing, refueling and rearming capabilities, be published and distributed to all aviation units in RVN.

4. Initiate a lateral search procedure for EDP aircraft parts between Transportation Direct Support Companies.

F. (U) Signal: NONE

G. (U) Medical: NONE

H. (U) Aviation and Safety: NONE

ANNEXES:

A-214th Cbt Avn Bn Structure

B-214th Cbt Avn Bn Troop List

C-Statistical Summary

D-Distribution Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

Leo C Bryan
LEO C. BRYAN
LTC, CE
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGC-SC (8 Feb 68)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period
Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP, APO 96266 26 February 1968

THRU: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) One copy of 214th CAB's Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR - 65) for the period ending 31 January 1968, is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 1-19, dated 3 November 1967.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following commets are made:

Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph E, 3, page 15. Dust suppression continues to be a major problem, particularly during the dry season. It is apparent that dust suppression in forward areas is unsatisfactory. USARV UNCLASSIFIED message AVHAV-S 32604, dated 18 January 1968, directed all commanders to "Review their priorities for soil stabilization to assure timely and continuing dust control in accessible forward operating areas as well as helicopter base areas." Every effort is being made to eliminate this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James E. Lybrand
JAMES E. LYBRAND
Major, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

AVFBC-RE-H (8 Feb 68)

2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CS FDR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WDK 51A-A)

DA, HQ II FFORCDEV, APO San Francisco 96266 7 MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C, APO 96307

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached ORLL of the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion and concurs with the report with the following comments:

a. p 13, para A1. This is not feasible because of the following message: USARV Uncle AVHCC-FD 92479 Palmer sends, 1707204 Dec 67, subject: Base Camp Support. This message states that preparation and processing of requests for additional manpower resources for base camp support continue to consume critically needed manhours at this and lower levels. Though the importance of this type of support is recognized, rigid manpower ceilings preclude USARV from forwarding such requirements unless trade-offs are cited. Trade-offs for this purpose are not feasible until critical USARV requirements of hi her priority have been accommodated. In the meantime, such support must be maintained within existing authorizations. Accordingly commanders are enjoined not to forward requests for increased manpower for base camp support. When additional manpower for this purpose becomes available HQ, USARV will advise.

b. p 13, para B1. Nonconcur. Aircraft assets do not allow for the requested augmentation.

c. p 14, para E1. The Tactical Aerodrome Directory, South Vietnam, distributed monthly by the 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (ACIC) United States Air Force, includes a Heliport Directory. While the current directory is far from complete, it does form an appropriate vehicle for listing the information recommended in item E1. The Tactical Aerodrome Directory, South Vietnam includes instructions on submission of errors, omissions or recommended changes to the publication.

d. p 15, para 3. Peneprine, if properly applied and maintained, provides adequate dust stabilization for helicopter operating facilities. Peneprine must be applied to a dry to slightly damp compacted surface and allowed to cure before being subjected to traffic. Violations of these principles will result in unsatisfactory treatment.

AVFBC-REL-H

7 MAR 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (ACCS CS FDR-6)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-1)

e. p 15, para E4. Nonconcur. It is felt that, under the present state of accounting mechanization/communications in RVM, formalized (i.e., as an obligation of some higher echelon of supply as a routine EDP action) lateral search is not practical. Informal search by the unit having the requirement is a more appropriate action.

f. p 16, para E1. Concurrence is subject to provision of frequencies and equipment from within existing 12th Avn Gp assets. No additional assets are currently available within III FFORCDEV Signal to support administrative/logistical communications means outside of the existing telephone teletype system.

g. p 16, para E2. Nonconcur. Metal planking is expensive in terms of dollars and installation effort. In cases where soil foundation conditions warrant, metal matting may be used for runways and touch down pads.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Ervin Head

E. M. McGRATH
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

22
AVBA-C (8 Feb 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO 96384


MAR 16 1968

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-CT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (ACOFOR DA),
Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 214th Combat Aviation
Battalion, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents as
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES M. GOLDMANN
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (8 Feb 68) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL)
(RCS CS FDR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1968 (UIC WDX 5AA-A)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francism 96375 20 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GQOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (WDX5AA) as indorsed.
2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.
3. A copy of this endorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, 1st Avn Bde
HQ, 214th Cmbt Avn Bn

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GPOP-DT (8 Feb 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 214th Combat Aviation
Bn, for Period Ending 31 Jan 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 APR 1968


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
2. The US Army Flight Information Detachment (Pacific) is responsible to insure all data relative to Army operations in RVN appears in the Tactical Airfield Directory, South Vietnam which was developed specifically for that purpose. A continuing effort is being made to update current information and obtain additional data for publication.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. F. Osbourn
K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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214TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

ANNEX A

OF
CONFIDENTIAL

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214TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION TROOP LIST

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
214th Cob Avn Bn	
Hqs & Hqs Co	Bear Cat
772nd Medical Detachment	Bear Cat
Pathfinder Detachment	Bear Cat
17th AHC	
613th TC Detachment	Long Binh
722nd Signal Detachment	Long Binh
93rd Medical Detachment	Long Binh
135th AHC	
614th TC Detachment	Black Horse
68th Signal Detachment	Black Horse
191st AHC	
606th TC Detachment	Bear Cat
26th Signal Detachment	Bear Cat
195th AHC	
609th TC Detachment	Long Binh
366th Signal Detachment	Long Binh
200th ASHC	
611th TC Detachment	Bear Cat
240th AHC	
619th TC Detachment	Bear Cat
932nd Signal Detachment	Bear Cat

ANNEX B

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

NOV	VC KBA		VC STRUCTURES		VC SAMPANS	
	CONF	EST	DEST	DAM	DEST	DAM
DEC	41	1	26	58	5	2
JAN	33	3	54	58	16	17
TOTALS	89	17	86	131	25	22

NOV	COMBAT ASSAULTS		DIRECT COMBAT SUPPORT		FLYING HOURS	
	TROOPS	TONS	TROOPS	TONS	UH-1	CH-47
NOV	40,471	1,432	18,494	6,054	8,265	1,195
DEC	23,420	377	32,630	9,101	9,923	1,241
JAN	42,167	529	27,346	6,610	12,261	1,120

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>Received</u>
Silver Star	4	0
LOM	1	1
DFC	24	4
SM	8	0
BS	19	12
BS "V"	3	0
AM	364	108
AM "V"	37	7
ACM	27	12
ACM "V"	5	4
PH	5	9
Total	497	157

ANNEX C

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Confidential

2b. GROUP

4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Nov 67-31 Jan 1968

5. AUTHORISI (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 214th Combat Aviation Battalion

6. REPORT DATE

8 February 1968

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

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12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

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1 NOV 68

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Security Classification